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§12.1. Medical Malpractice Statute. In Paro v. Longwood Hospital/ 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld, against a barrage of challenges, the 
constitutionality of a 1975 statute mandating the submission of all ac-
tions for "malpractice, error, or mistake against a provider of health 
care" to a pre-trial screening panel.2 The panel is composed of a 
superior court judge, an attorney, and a representative of the health 
care industry.3 Its main function is to evaluate medical claims for mal-
practice, error, or mistake on the basis of an offer of proof by the com-
" BERNARD ORTWEIN is an associate professor of law at Suffolk University 
Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the able assistance of Ms. Elizabeth 
Starrs in the preparation of this chapter. 
§12.1. 1 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977). 
2 G.L. c. 231, § 60B addedby Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 5 provides in part: 
Every action for malpractice, error or mistake against a provider of health 
care shall be heard by a tribunal consisting of a single justice of the superior 
court, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the commonwealth under the 
provisions of section two of chapter one hundred and twelve and an attorney 
authorized to practice law in the commonwealth, at which hearing the plaintiff 
shall present an offer of proof and said tribunal shall determine if the evidence 
presented if properly substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question 
of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry or whether the plaintiff's case is 
merely an unfortunate medical result. 
Said physician shall be selected by the single justice from a list submitted 
by the Massachusetts Medical Society representing the field of medicine in which 
the alleged injury occurred and licensed to practice medicine and surgery in 
the commonwealth under the provisions of section two of chapter one hundred 
and twelve. The list submitted to the single justice shall consist only of physi-
cians who practice medicine outside the county where the defendant practices or 
resides or if the defendant is a medical institution or facility outside the county 
where said institution or facility is located. The attorney shall be selected by 
the single justice from a list submitted by the Massachusetts Bar Association. 
The attorney and physician shall, subject to appropriation, each be compensated 
in the amount of fifty dollars. 
Where the action of malpractice is brought against a provider of health care 
not a physician, the physician's position on the tribunal shall be replaced by a 
representative of that field of medicine in which the alleged tort or breach of 
contract occurred, as selected by the superior court justice in a manner he 
determines fair and equitable. 
3 See id. 
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plainant in order to determine whether a "legitimate question of liability 
appropriate for judicial inquiry" has been presented.4 If a decision 
is made in favor of the plaintiff, then he or she may proceed with the 
regular civil action appropriate to the claim. If, on the other hand, the 
decision is in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff must post a bond in 
order to continue the action.5 The amount of the bond is set at $2,000 
but the judge is granted the discretion to raise it if the judge deems 
it necessary. If there is cause to believe the plaintiff is indigent, the 
judge may lower the amount of the bond requirement.6 The purpose 
of the bond is to guarantee indemnification to the defendant if the 
defendant prevails in the trial court. Apparently, the legislature had 
hoped this provision in particular would serve as a deterrent to frivolous 
medical malpractice claims. 
Similar statutes have been enacted across the country 7 in an apparent 
effort to discourage frivolous medical malpractice claims, thereby mini-
mizing losses to insurance companies and increasing the likelihood of 
continued availability of liability coverage at reasonable rates.8 While 
comts in other jurisdictions have differed on the constitutionality of the 
medical-legal screening tribunal procedure,9 the Supreme Judicial Court 
in Para systematically and conclusively rejected each constitutional chal-
lenge to the Massachusetts statute. The relative ease with which the 
Court disposed of the constitutional objections is indicative of the pre-
vailing judicial policy of upholding, wherever possible, practical solutions 
to burdensome societal problems and recognizing the legislature's power 
to address snch problems one step at a time, as long as its purportedly 
4 Id. 
5 Id. Paragraph 7 of § 60B provides in relevant part: 
If a finding is made for the defendant the plaintiff may pursue the claim 
through the usual judicial process only upon filing bond in the amount of two 
thousand dollars secured by cash or its equivalent with the clerk of the court 
in which the case is pending, payable to the defendant for costs assessed, 
including witness and experts fees and attorneys fees if the plaintiff does not 
prevail in the final judgment. Said single justice may, within his discretion, 
increase the amount of the bond required to be filed. If said bond is not posted 
within thirty days of the tribunal's finding the action shall be dismissed. Upon 
motion filed by the plaintiff, and a determination by the court that the plaintiff 
is indigent said justice may reduce the amount of the bond but may not eliminate 
the requirement thereof. 
6 See id. 
7 See Grossman, An Analysis of 1975 Legislation Relating to Medical Malpractice 
in A LEGISLATOR's GUIDE To THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IssuE at 3, 4 ( 1976). 
8 See Note, The ~lassachusetts Medical Malpractice Statute: A Constitutional 
Perspective, 11 SufL L. Rev. 1289 ( 1977) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice Statute]. 
9 Compare Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1976) (upholding, but with 
reservations, the constitutionality of Florida statute) with Wright v. Central Dupage 
Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N .E.2d 736 ( 1976) (declaring similar Illinois 
statute unconstitutional). 
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remedial actions are not patently or flagrantly unconstitutional. 10 While 
the statute under attack in Paro may not be unconstitutional on its face, 
there are some latent issues of at least questionable constitutionality 
that the Supreme Judicial Court had an opportunity to address directly 
but chose instead to ignore in favor of a superficial assessment of the 
problem. 
The Paro case involved an action originally brought by Robert Paro, 
in his own right and as next friend for his daughter, Lynn Marie. 11 
Lynn Marie was born some ten years before commencement of the 
action on the premises of the defendant hospital. Employees of the 
defendant aided in the child's deliveryP The plaintiffs claimed that 
the defendant's negligence in performing a routine application of silver 
nitrate to the newborn's eyes caused Lynn Marie to suffer "to this day" 
from a visible scar on her left cheek.13 They further alleged that in-
sufficient care was taken to correct this mistake.14 
Following the filing of the complaint and answer, both pmties ap-
peared before a malpractice tribunal formed pursuant to the provisions 
of chapter 231, section 60B. 15 The tribunal found that "the evidence 
submitted by plaintiffs, even if properly substantiated, [was] not sufficient 
to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial in-
quiry." 16 As required by the statute, the tribunal set a $2,000 bond as 
a condition for continuance of the action by the plaintiffs.17 The Paros 
moved to have the bond reduced on grounds of financial hardship but 
the motion was denied.18 When the thirty-day statutory time period for 
posting the bond had run out, the action was dismissed.19 Plaintiff~ 
appealed the dismissal, contending that the tribunal procedure violates 
equal protection, due process, and separation of powers provisions of the 
10 373 Mass. at 651, 369 N.E.2d at 989. See also Massachusetts Board of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). In Murgia the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of G.L. c. 32, § 26(3), which mandated retirement of 
uniformed state police officers at fifty. Confronted with an equal protection challenge, 
the Court did not hesitate to apply the "rational relationship" test in assessing the 
statute. Deferring to the legislature, the Court's concluding remarks are indicative 
of the prevailing judicial hesitancy to question the legislature's motives in cases 
of this nature: "We do not decide todav that the [Massachusetts statute] is wise, 
that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Massachusetts] 
might ideally espouse or that a more just and humane system could not be devised." 
Id. at 317. 




15 Id. See note 5 supra. 
16 Id. See note 5 supra. 
17 373 Mass. at 647, 369 N.E.2d at 987. 
18 Id. See note 12 supra. 
19 373 Mass. at 647, 369 N.E.2d at 987 see note 5 supra. 
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Massachusetts 20 and United States Constitutions.21 The Supreme Judicial 
Court granted their application for direct appellate review.22 
The Court initially addressed the plaintiffs' equal protection challenges. 
They claimed that section 60B implicitly contravenes fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees by creating two unlawful classifications: medical mal-
practice plantiffs versus other tort plaintiffs and plaintiffs versus defen-
dants. 23 In approaching these contentions Justice Quirico, writing for 
the Court, concluded that because there was no fundamental right or 
suspect class involved, the applicable test would be the "rational relation" 
test. 24 In sum, stated Justice Quirico, unless the statute is patently 
offensive, the reviewing court must uphold its constitutionality and defer 
to the legislature. The Supreme Judicial Court, finding no such blatant 
defect in the statute, hypothesized the legislature's rationale and conse-
quently determined that the equal protection challenge had failed.25 
The mechanical treatment given the equal protection claim in Paro 
provides a classic example of the inadequacies of the traditional standard 
of review adopted by both the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
and the United States Supreme Court.26 While members of both courts 
have acknowledged in earlier cases that such a problem exists,27 neither 
court appears eager to tackle it head-on. At least one member of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, however, has alluded to the fact that some 
steps should be taken to overcome the rigidity of the two-tiered equal 
protection analysis. In the 1971 case of Pinnick v. Cleary,28 Chief Jus-
tice Tauro, in· a concurring opinion, indicated the need for judicial ex-
amination of the relationship between the objective of a statute and the 
classification which it creates. 29 Since the fourteenth amendment re-
quires that persons similarly situated must be treated equally, blind 
20 See Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XXX (separation of powers). The Paras' due process 
claims involved the contentions that the statute required them to purchase justice, 
contrary to Mass. Canst. pt. I, art. XI, and denied them their right to a jury trial, 
contrary to Mass. Canst. pt. I, art. XV. By cutting off their access to the courts, the 
Paras claimed, their due process right to be heard was denied. See 373 Mass. at 
651-52, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
21 See U.S. Const. amend. art. XIV. 
22 373 Mass. at 647, 369 N.E.2d at 987. See G.L. c. 211A, § 10(A). 
23 Id. at 648-49, 369 N.E.2d at 987-88. 
24 Id. at 650, 369 N.E.2d at 988-89. 
25 Id. at 651, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
26 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
16-17 (1973); Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 321 N.E.2d 
911 (1974). 
27 See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 36, 271 N.E.2d 592, 
614 ( 1971) ( Tauro, C.J., concurring). See also Malpractice Statute, note 8 supra 
at 1300-01, n.62. 
28 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971 ). 
29 Id. at 36, 271 N.E.2d at 614 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). 
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endorsements of legislative enactments (if the subject matter of the 
statute does not mandate the "strict scrutiny," in-depth analysis) reflect 
the faulty presumption that the legislature always acts in the best interest 
of the public.30 Surely no legislature operates in a vacuum; no legisla-
ture is immune to special interest groups and lobbyists. 31 It should, 
therefore, be the duty of the judiciary to apply the precept that legisla-
tive means must substantially further legislative ends.32 
In the Pinnick concurring opinion, Chief Justice Tauro suggested that 
where an issue is "novel or complex" the Court should intervene and 
examine the factual basis of the statute in question. Certainly, it has 
been suggested, and properly so, that the Massachusetts medical mal-
practice screening panel statute presents such a "novel and complex" 
issue and thus is an appropriate subject for more intensive review.33 
Nevertheless, the Paro Court chose to ignore Chief Justice Tauro's rec-
ommendation despite the fact that in no other tort action must a claimant 
prove the merits of his allegations to an administrative body before being 
allowed access to the courtroom. The Court seemed equally willing to 
overlook the distinct procedural and substantive advantages afforded the 
defendant by the dual requirements of plaintiff's bond and pre-trial 
proof of a meritorious claim.34 The Court concluded its equal protection 
analysis in Paro with the recognition that the legislature may be per-
mitted to address a problem one step at a time. It noted further that 
the existence of other potentially more effective methods of solving the 
problem forms an insufficient basis from wpich to strike down a statute.35 
The second contention which the Court addressed in Paro was the 
plaintiffs' due process challenge. Essentially, this claim was directed 
toward the stahtte's bond requirement.36 The Court viewed the "access 
to the courts" issue (based on the placing of a financial obstacle to the 
filing of a civil suit) as avoidable because the statute gives the judge 
great discretion in setting the amount of the bond. It stated that "[a]s 
long as the discretion is exercised without unreasonably prohibiting 
meritorious claims, no constitutional violation will exist." 37 Since no 
bond is required for claims that the panel has determined as having 
merit, the Court reasoned that the likelihood of meritorious claimants be-
30 See Malpractice Statute, note 8 supra at 1302. 
31 See id. 
32 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 
86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20 ( 1972). 
33 See Malpractice Statute, note 8 supra at 1303. 
34 See 373 Mass. at 651, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
35 Id. 
36 See note 20 supra. 
37 373 Mass. at 652-53, 369 N.E.2d at 990. 
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ing required to post a bond is too small to be significant. 38 Without really 
analyzing this contention, the Court, in upholding the constitutionality 
of the bond requirement, relied on Damaskos v. Board of Appeal of 
Boston.39 In Damaskos the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of imposing a bond upon one who wishes to appeal a decision 
made by a zoning board of appeals.40 The Court reasoned that the 
judge has discretion in setting the bond amount in order to discourage 
frivolous appeals but not umeasonably to obstruct those claims with 
merit.41 
A second element of the plaintiffs' due process challenge was the claim 
that the imposition of the bond forced him to purchase justice in con-
travention of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.42 Since the 
object of the Declaration is to guarantee "that all litigants similarly 
situated may appeal to the courts for both relief and for defense under 
like conditions and with like protection and without discrimination,"43 
the Para Court viewed this claim as analogous on its merits to the equal 
protection argument previously dismissed. This issue was likewise sum-
marily dismissed.44 
The Court then proceeded to invalidate plaintiffs' third ·due process 
contention that the bond requirement violated the right to a jury trial. 
Relying on Orasz v. Colonial Tavern, Inc.,45 the Court reiterated the 
principle that there is no absolute right to a jury trial.46 Rather, this 
right may "be regulated as to the mode in which [it] shall be exercised 
so long as such regulation does not impair the substance of the right." 47 
Again, the impact of judicial discretion in setting the bond came into 
play. The Court held that the obstruction presented by the medical 
malpractice tribunal procedure does not impair the right of a trial by 
jury because it is a limited obstruction, subject to judicial discretion in 
setting a bond requirement so as not to burden umeasonably meritorious 
suits.48 
38 Id. at 653, 369 N.E.2d at 990. 
39 359 Mass. 55, 267 N .E.2d 897 ( 1971). 
40 Id. at 63-64, 267 N.E.2d at 902-03. 
41 Id. at 64, 267 N.E.2d at 903. 
42 See Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XI. 
43 373 Mass. at 654, 369 N.E.2d at 991, quoting Old Colony R.R. v. Assessor of 
Boston, 300 Mass. 439, 450 ( 1941 ). 
44 373 Mass. at 654, 369 N.E.2d at 991. It is interesting to contrast the Court's 
static due process position relative to the Paros' challenge based on the Massachusetts 
Constitution with the position taken by the Court in Commonwealth v. Sees, 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 536, 373 N.E.2d 1151. In Sees the Court was more willing to give 
independent meaning and rationale to the Massachusetts Constitution. Sees is 
discussed in § 12.4 infra. 
45 365 Mass. 131, 310 N.E.2d 311 ( 1974). 
46 373 Mass. at 654, 369 N.E.2d at 991. 
47 Id., quoting Orasz, 365 Mass. at 134, 310 N.E.2d at 312. 
48 373 Mass. at 655, 369 N.E.2d at 991. 
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The final due process challenge focused on an allegation that the 
plaintiffs' common law rights had been abrogated without providing a 
reasonable substitute.49 Addressing itself to this argument, the Court 
first emphasized that the medical malpractice tribunal does not eliminate 
the plaintiff's substantive right of recovery; it merely alters the proce-
dure for enforcing that right. 50 Alternatively, the Court reasoned that 
even if a substantive right had been abrogated, the tribunal procedure 
provides a reasonable substitute because any rights lost by plaintiffs are 
offset by the tribunal's very existence, which keeps the general cost of 
medical care down. The Court reasoned that the benefit to plaintiffs as 
consumers outweighs any legal disadvantage to which they may be 
subjected. 51 
In sum, not one of the due process challenges in Para was considered 
worthy of in-depth analysis by the Court. Each was systematically and 
conclusively rejected. The Court appears to have given scant consid-
eration to the potentially prejudicial impact of the bond requirement. 
Nor was the Court persuaded that the requirement that all claimants 
must present their case before the medical malpractice panel prior to 
any filing in the trial court places a double burden on the plaintiffs. 
The Court did not attempt to distinguish its previous holdings establish-
ing that the right to a trial by jury includes guarantees of both fact 
determination by an impartial body 52 and a full and fair hearing upon 
all relevant issues.53 Finally, the Court's treatment of the plaintiffs' 
claim that their common law rights had been abrogated lacked analytical 
strength. Conclusory statements without reference to a direct precedent 
or close analysis of the facts of the instant case reflect insubstantial 
reasoning and unimpressive law. 
The final constitutional question considered by the Para Court was 
a statutory challenge based on an alleged dual violation of the principle 
of separation of powers. The plaintiffs here claimed that the malprac-
tice panel falls within the legislative branch of government and that it 
interferes with the judiciary because its findings are admissible at trial, 
because it obstructs access to a judicial hearing, and because its two 
non-judicial members can override decisions of the judge.54 The Court 
49 Id. The Court identified this challenge not as a procedural due process chal- . 
lenge, but as a substantive due process challenge. Id. 
5o Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See Commonwealth v. Bellino, 320 Mass. 635, 639, 71 N.E.2d 411, 415 
( 1947). See also Malpractice Statute, note 8 supra at 1304, n.76. 
53 See New England Novelty Co. v. Sandberg, 315 Mass. 739, 750, 54 N.E.2d 915, 
919 ( 1954) (a "trial by jury comprehends a full and fair hearing upon all relevant 
issues ... "where jury decides all issues of fact). See also Malpractice Statute, note 
8 supra at 1304, n.76. 
54 373 Mass. at 655-56, 369 N.E.2d at 991-92. 
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properly refused to address the first of these separation of powers chal-
lenges because these plaintiffs did not go to trial and, therefore, were 
without standing.55 After discussing the overlap of the three branches 
of government,56 the Court determined that the claim that the panel is 
a legislative body obstructing entrance to the judicial system failed on 
two grounds. First, because the statute allows judicial discretion in the 
setting of bond, the Court rejected the idea that the panel is an obstruc-
tion of any significance. 57 Second, the Court stated that the tribunal 
procedure in question is a function of the judicial department and not 
of the legislature.58 Here, the Court emphasized the "intimate connec-
tion" that the tribunal has with the judiciary.59 Finally, the Court 
considered whether the medical malpractice tribunal is unconstitutional 
because the two lay panel members can override the judge in the decision 
of purely legal issues, such as questions relating to the admissibility of 
evidence. 60 In rejecting this _claim the Court relied on its interpretation 
of the statutory language, which led the Court to conclude that it grants 
the judge the preeminent role in the tribunal proceedings: while the 
attorney and the health care representative are placed on the panel 
because of their expertise in relevant fields,61 the judge chooses these 
other panel members and sets the bond.62 The Court viewed the com-
bination of these individuals as essential in the determination of the 
ultimate issue before the tribunal.: whether the plaintiff has a legally 
suffi·cient claim. 63 The Court was careful to point out, however, that 
while this decision is a joint one, the responsibility for deciding purely 
!egal issues is left entirely to the judicial member of the panel.64 Thus, 
the separation of powers challenge failed because the Court found that 
the statutory procedure contained no potential for substantial interfer-
ence with the judicial function. 
In the final analysis, it appears that the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, in the Paro decision, has again chosen to accept the judg-
ment of the legislature. The Court appears to view the medical mal-
practice screening panel as a necessary, albeit imperfect, element in the 
battle to control the costs of medical care in the Commonwealth. The 
55 Id. at 656, 369 N.E.2d at 992. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 656-57, 369 N.E.2d at 992. 
58 Id. at 657, 369 N.E.2d at 992. 
59 The Court stated: "The tribunal's intimate connection with the judicial pro-
ceeding makes it clear that the hearing procedure is itself a part of the judicial 
process." Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 657, 369 N.E.2d at 992..g3, 
62 Id. at 657, 369 N.E.2d at 992. 
63 Id. at 657, 369 N.E.2d at 992-93. 
64 Id. at 657, 369 N.E.2d at 993. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1978 [1978], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1978/iss1/15
§12.2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 273 
holding in Para may very well reinforce the legislative goal, but the 
Court's treatment of the issues was unnecessarily vague in some areas. 
Furthermore, its constant reliance on judicial discretion in setting the 
bond seems somewhat misplaced for two reasons. First, there is a 
question as to whether or not indigency is a requisite for lowering the 
bond amount or merely a guideline to be followed. Second, other than 
indigency, there are no guidelines for altering the amount of the bond 
requirement. Should the decision be based on ability to pay or the 
merit of the claim or both? Since this aspect of the statute is so general 
and the rights it may affect are so substantial, the Para Court's constant 
reliance on judicial discretion in setting the bond requirement is mis-
placed unless buttressed by more specific guidelines to judges concern-
ing the standards to be used in determining indigency. 
The medical malpractice screening panel as established by chapter 
231, section 60B, may very well prove effective in screening out frivolous 
claims, thereby minimizing losses to insurance companies and increasing 
the likelihood of the availability of coverage. Nevertheless, had the 
Para Court addressed the constitutional challenges to this procedure 
more thoroughly, its holding might be more acceptable. 
§12.2. Freedom of Access to Migrant Fann Labor Camps. In 1971 
the General Court amended General Laws chapter Ill, section 128H, 
to require, among other things, reasonable visitation rights for the 
migrant farm worker who is often compelled to live in housing owned, 
rented, or leased by the farm operator.1 In the tension between the 
farm owner or operator who seeks to control ingress and egress to 
§12.2. 1 G.L. c. 111, § 1284 was amended by Acts of 1971, c. 373 entitled "An 
Act Further Regulating the Visitation Rights o£ Migrant Workers Living in Quarters 
Apart from the Living Quarters of Their Employer." The text of the amendment 
reads: 
The Department of Public Health shall, as a part of its inspection of a site 
for a farm labor camp, determine what educational and recreational opportunities 
may be available for migrant workers, and shall, as far as is practical, encourage 
the development of such opportunities in cooperation with local and state 
agencies. The department shall protect the right of the migrant worker to 
enter and leave the premises of the employer during the period of his employ-
ment, and shall include in its certificate of occupancy a notification to the worker 
that such right exists, notwithstanding any contract provision to the contrary. 
A worker living in qumters of his employer shall have reasonable rights of 
visitation in his living quarters outside of regular working hours and the 
certificate of occupancy ·issued by the department shall include notification, in 
English and in Spanish, of said rights. The department shall establish, by 
promulgation of regulations, such minimum standards relating to the rights of 
visitation under this section as will ensure the adequate protection of said rights. 
The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity upon petition brought by the 
development in the name of the commonwealth to restrain and enjoin violations 
of this, or of section one hundred and twenty-eight G, or regulations promulgated 
thereunder. 
9
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camps through exercise of his property rights and the migrant laborers 
who are generally forced to live on the owner's or operator's land without 
ready transportation to the outside world,~ the statute favors the latter. 
In Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Department of Public Health,3 the 
Supreme Judicial Court was presented during the Survey year with an 
opportunity to address several issues regarding rights of access to labor 
camps. Consolidated Cigars Corporation ("Consolidated") is a corpo-
ration which plants, harvests, and processes shade grown tobacco in the 
Connecticut River Valley area.4 The particular controversy centered 
upon the employment contracts drafted by Consolidated and signed by 
the teen-aged workers it employed during school vacation periods, con-
tracts which tended to restrict access by visitors to the workers' housing 
facilities." Consolidated sought declaratory judgments that chapter ll1, 
section 128H and its attendant regulations are unconstitutional on their 
face and as applied to Consolidated and its facilities. 6 The Department 
of Public Health ("Department") filed a counterclaim for injunctive 
relief, and both parties moved for summary judgment.7 A judge of the 
Superior Court declared the rights of the respective parties and en-
joined Consolidated from any further violations of the regulation in ques-
tion.s The Supreme Judicial Court granted Consolidated's application 
for direct appellate review and affirmed the lower court's decision.9 
Consolidated advanced three underlying reasons in support for its 
claim that the statute and regulations could not be applied to it. First, 
the young persons employed during school vacations are not "migrant 
farm workers" within the meaning of the statute and the statute does 
not apply to its facilities. Second, the statutes and regulations relative 
to visitor access to worker camps are unconstitutional. Third, even if 
the regulations are constitutional, they exceed the scope of the enabling 
statute.10 
The Court quickly and correctly disposed of the contention that the 
student workers are not within the class protected by the statute, i.e., 
2 See generally Sherman & Levy, Free Access to Migrant Labor Camps, 57 
A.B.A.J. 434 (1971). 
3 372 Mass. 844, 364 N.E.2d 1202 (1977). 
4 Id. at 846, 364 N.E.2d at 1205. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 844-45, 364 N.E.2d at 1204. 
7 Id. at 845, 364 N.E.2d at 1204. 
s Id. Consolidated's violation consisted in denying assess to individuals seeking 
to visit its facilities for teen-aged workers, pursuant to a right reserved in its em-
ployment contracts. The Court identified as individuals denied access a paralegal 
and a chaplain. Id. at 846-47, 364 N.E.2d at 1205. 
For the text of the regulations adapted by the Department of Public Health, see 
note 34 infra. 
9 372 Mass. at 858, 364 N.E.2d at 1211. 
1o Id. at 847, 364 N.E.2d at 1205. 
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that they were not "migrant workers." 11 It rejected Consolidated's 
definition, based on a Congressional report,12 that a migrant worker 
"follow[s] the crops"13 and is thus a person who works primarily in 
agriculture, taking his family with him to temporary residences.14 The 
Court defined for itself migrant workers as "those workers who are em-
ployed to perform farm labor and are housed in farm labor camps." 15 
The Court inferred that the legislature intended "to insulate farm work-
ers from potential exploitation while they are housed in farm labor 
camps .... " 16 It reasoned that this intent would be defeated if protec-
tion depended on the individual's activities before or after employment 
as a farm worker in a campY The second contention relating to the 
reach of the statute was that since section 128H applied only where 
the workers live in "quarters apart from the living quarters of their 
employer,"18 it could not be applied to residence halls owned or leased 
by Consolidated.19 The Court rejected this contention also, adopting 
the Department's construction that this phrase means the statute is not to 
apply to the situation where "the farm operator houses his employees in 
his own house." 20 Thus the Court held that the operator's ownership of 
the residence or its agent's presence therein does not cause the exemp-
tion in section 128H to apply.21 
Next the Court turned to Consolidated's three-pronged attack on the 
statute's constitutionality. Its first constitutional contention was that the 
11 See note 1 supra. 
12 See H. R. REP. No. 1458, 88th Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1964) reprinted in [1964] U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2900, 2924 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. 
13 The quoted language is evidently that of the plaintiff-appellant. See 372 Mass. 
at 849, 364 N .E.2d at 1206. 
14 House Report, note 12 supra, defines a "migrant agricultural employee~· as a 
worker "(a) whose primary employment is in agriculture ... and (b) who establishes 
with his family ... a temporary residence." 
15 372 Mass. at 849, 364 N.E.2d at 1206. In refusing to adopt the federal definition 
offered by Consolidated, the Court observed another federal definition of the migrant 
farm worker: 
This argument is eviscerated by the fact that the definition relied on by 
Consolidated is not even the sole description of the term within the Federal 
system. Another definition, entitled to no less weight than that Cited by Con-
solidated, is: a "seasonal farmworker who performs or has performed during 
the preceding twelve months agricultural labor which requires travel such that 
the worker is unable to return to his/her domicile (accepted place of residence) 
within tlle same day." 42 Fed. Reg. 1659 ( 1977) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 97.203). 
Id. n.6. 
16 372 Mass. at 849, 364 N.E.2d at 1206 (emphasis in the origh1al). 
17 Id. 
18 See the title to the 1971 legislation, set forth supra at note 1. 
19 372 Mass. at 850, 364 N,E.2d at 1207. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. The Court also noted that while both sides had argued the "company town" 
philosophy (see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 ( 1946)) the analogy was inapplic-
able. Id. at 849-50 n.7, 364 N.E.2d at 1206-07 n.7. 
11
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regulations denied it property rights, a due process argument.22 The 
Court responded with the truism that enjoyment of private property is 
not an absolute right but may be "subordinated to reasonable regula-
tions that are essential to place, safety and welfare of the community." 23 
Basing its conclusions on a Massachusetts Senate report on migratory 
labor 24 which significantly influenced the statute under attack,25 the 
Court readily accepted the legislative premise that migrant workers need 
special protections. The statute therefore was fot\nd to be rationally 
related to this need. 26 Furthermore, the Court concluded that creating 
a right of access to itinerant farm laborers was a reasonable means to 
attain the legislative goal of regulating reasonably the working and liv-
ing conditions of migrant workers. 27 
Consolidated directed the second prong of its constitutional attack 
against the statute's over-inclusiveness, alleging that the statute and its 
attendant access regulations were so broad as to permit access to those 
whose presence in the camp would in no way aid in achieving the ulti-
mate legislative goal.28 Having already adopted a rational-relation 
standard of review, the Court reiterated that its role was not to evaluate 
the wisdom of any particular statute or regulation.29 Thus, it did not 
feel called upon to compel the Department to find the "least restrictive" 
regulation possible.30 Observing that Consolidated had failed to present 
any concrete facts supporting its allegation of over-inclusiveness, the 
Court held that the statutes and their attendant regulations are a valid 
exel'cise of the state police power and consequently are consistent 
with established notions of constitutional due process.31 
The Corporation's final constitutional attack was based on the allega-
tion that a statute exclusively regulating farm labor camps violated its 
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, because other types 
of temporary housing facilities are not regulated in a similar manner. 32 
The Court quickly recognized the fundamental weakness in this argu-
22 Id. at 851, 364 N.E.2d at 1207. 
23 Id. Justice Abrams, writing for the Court, conclusively stated that the regula-
tions at issue amounted at most to a "limited incursion" into the owner's property 
rights. Id. 
24 1967 SENATE Doc. No. 1303 at 14-53 (Massachusetts). 
25 The Court, in relying on legislative history, relied on New Bedford v. New 
Bedford, Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket S.S. Auth., 330 Mass. 442, 
449, 114 N.E.2d 553, 557 ( 1953), for the proposition that it may consider such a 
report in finding legislative intent. 372 Mass. at 852, 364 N .E.2d at 1208. 
26 372 Mass. at 852, 364 N.E.2d at 1208. 
27 Id. at 852-53, 364 N.E.2d at 1208. 
28 Id. at 853, 364 N.E.2d at 1208-09. 
29 Id. 
3o Id. 
31 Id. at 854, 364 N.E.2d at 1209. 
32 Id. 
12
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ment. The Court reasoned that in a situation such as the one in 
question, where the owner/lessor is also the employer, the employer/ 
employee relationship is sufficiently distinguishable from the typical 
provision of housing situation to immunize it from a successful equal 
protection challenge. 33 
The final argument offered by the Corporation in its effort to exempt 
itself from the statute's effect was that even if the statute were to be up-
held, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Public Health34 
33 Id. 
34 Department of Public Health, Rights of Visitation for Migrant Workers, 13 
Code of Mass. Regs. 825-28 ( 1971) provides in relevant part: 
Definitions 
C. "Visitor" shall mean any individual or group of individuals seeking to enter 
a farm labor camp for the purpose of contacting or communicating with one 
or more workers. 
2. Reasonable Rights of Visitation 
Workers living in quarters apart from the living quarters of the operator 
shall be entitled to receive visitors outside of regular working hours. 
A. Visitation hours on working days will begin after. working hours or at 
6:00 p.m., whichever is the earliest, and end no earlier than four ( 4) hours 
after the end of the working day or at 10:30 p.m., whichever is the latest. On 
non-working days visiting hours will be in effect from at least 10:00 a.m. to 
10:30 p.m ..... 
B. The limitation on hours in subsection A shall not apply to the organizations, 
their agents, employees or representatives listed herein: 
( i) Federal, State, local or other governmental agencies, departments or 
boards; 
(ii) Physicians, dentists, and other medical or para-medical personnel; 
(iii) Priests, ministers, rabbis; 
( iv) Agencies or organizations which are funded in whole or part by 
governmental funds; 
( v) Recognized charitable and social agencies; 
(vi) Members of the press [emphasis added]. 
C. A worker may terminate a visitation with regard to himself only. Such 
termination must be orally communicated to the visitor by the worker himself, 
and no operator may deny a visitor access to a worker prior to such communica-
tion. Such termination shall not apply to the Department [emphasis added]. 
4. Visitor Rights 
A. In order for an individual or group of individuals to be regarded as a visitor, 
it is not required: 
( i) That the worker or workers initiate the request for the visit; 
( ii) That the visitor secure approval of the farm labor camp operator. 
B. An operator may ask a visitor for reasonable identification but shall not 
deny access on this basis [emphasis added]. 
7. Salesmen 
An operator may deny salesmen access to a farm labor camp, provided that: 
A. He gains no commercial advantage, directly or indirectly, thereby; or 
B. The salesman in question is not the only source of the product or 
service offered reasonably available to the workers. 
13
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exceeded the scope of the delegated authority.35 The Court again applied 
the rational relation test to the regulations. It conclusively disagreed 
with plaintiff's position, finding that the regulations were within the 
broad authority vested in the Department. 36 
The Consolidated Court reviewed in some depth the status of migrant 
workers in Massachusetts. The Court's conclusion that statutorily guar-
anteed access rights are reasonable means to attain the legislative goal 
of improving the conditions of migrant workers, while not surprising, 
carries great impact. Under its rational relation standard of review, the 
Court was correct in disregarding the various United States Supreme 
Court "company town" decisions 37 and assessing the statute along 
traditional constitutional lines, despite the fact that there are similarities 
between the labor-management :relationship in a "company town" and 
that same relationship in a migrant labor camp. Rather than using 
a narrow, technical, legalistic approach to solve a broad sociological 
problem, the Court deliberately assessed the totality of the situation in 
arriving at its decision. While the Court did not specifically address 
these issues, its decision in Consolidated was an implicit affirmation of 
the migrant worker's right to freedom of speech, assembly, and associa-
tion. Thus, it would appear that when confronted with a challenge to 
legislative attempts to deal with an overwhelming societal problem, the 
Court will continue to defer to the wisdom of the legislature absent 
what it perceives as a blatant transgression of civil liberties or funda-
mental rights. 
§12.3. Statewide Residency Requirements for Police Officers. The 
Supreme Judicial Court was called upon during the Survey year to 
determine the constitutionality of General Laws chapter 41, section 
99A, 1 in two cases decided the same day. In the first case, Doris v . 
. 35 372 Mass. at 854-55, 364 N.E.2d at 1209. Consolidated's major premise was 
that the regulations promulgated pursuant to § 128H deviated from the statute's 
mandates. In other words, the statute spoke to the rights of the farm workers to 
receive visitors whereas, the Corporation argued, the regulations spoke in terms of 
the visitors' rights to gain access to the labor camps. The distinction, while poten-
tially valid, was considered insufficient to overcome the presumption that a regulation 
promulgated under a statute determined valid is also valid so long as it is "reasonably 
related to the purpose of the enabling legislation," Mourning v. Family Publications 
Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973), quoting from Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of 
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 ( 1969). Thus construed, the regulations were found 
to be valid by the Supreme Judicial Court. 372 Mass. at 855-57, 364 N.E.2d at 
1209-10. 
36 372 Mass. at 855-57, 364 N.E.2d at 1209-10. 
37 See id. at 849-50 n.7, 364 N.E.2d at 1206-07 n.7. 
§12.3. 1 G.L. c. 41, § 99A provides in full: 
"The members of the regular police department of a city or town may reside outside 
said city or town; provided, they resiae within the commonwealth and within ten 
miles of the limits of said city or town." 
14
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Police Commissioner of Boston,2 the plaintiff represented a class of 
approximately two hundred Boston police officers who resided outside 
the City of Boston but within the Commonwealth. Their places of resi-
dence were all located more than ten miles from the City limits.3 Some 
of the officers lived in municipalities that were within ten miles of the 
Boston city limits, however.4 
Doris sought injunctive and declaratory relief based upon the alleged 
unconstitutionality of section 99A and a further declaration that the 
term "reside" as used in that section is unconstitutionally vague.5 The 
Superior Court reserved the case and reported it to the Appeals Court 
without decision.6 The Supreme Judicial Court then transferred the 
case on its own motion. 7 
The major constitutional attack rested on the grounds that section 
99A violated the Home Rule Amendment 8 and the ex post facto prohibi-
tions of the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions.9 Section 8 
of the Home Rule Amendment provides in part: 
The general court shall have the power to act in relation to cities 
and towns, but only by general laws which apply alike to all cities, 
or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer 
than two, and by special laws . . .. 
The plaintiff argued that residency requirements for municipal job 
holders are of local concern and are best left to the municipalities and 
that the Commonwealth possessed only a remote interest in matters of 
this nature.10 The Court dismissed this home rule challenge rather 
summarily, indicating that section 99A is not focused merely on the 
local matters of a particular city or town but rather applies equally to 
all cities and towns.U Further, the Court stressed that the General 
Court has extremely broad powers, regardless of the Home Rule Amend-
ment, which are limited only to the extent that it may not single out a 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 416, 373 N.E.2d 944. 
3 Id. at 417-18, 373 N.E.2d at 946. 
4 Id. at 418, 373 N.E.2d at 946. 
5 Id. at 416-17 n.1 and 421, 373 N.E.2d at 946 n.1 and 948. 
6 Id. at 416, 373 N.E.2d at 946. 
7 Id. 
s See Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 8. 
9 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto 
Law .... "); Mass. Const. part I, art. XXIV ("Laws made to punish for actions 
done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes 
by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles of a free government."). By Acts of 1971, c. 956, § 2, § 99A was made 
applicable to police officers receiving their appointment "prior to and subsequent 
to the effective date" of the statute. 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 419, 373 N.E.2d at 947, 
11 Id. 15
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city or town for special treatment but must legislate uniformly.12 In 
the Court's opinion, the clear intent of the legislature was to withdraw 
discretion from municipalities on the question of residency of police 
officers and impose the restriction as a matter of statewide policy, a 
decision entirely within the legislature's discretion.13 
The plaintiff also argued that the word "reside" appearing in the 
statute is ambiguous, thus making the statute unconstitutionally vague.14 
The plaintiff's contention was that the word "reside" could mean either 
the actual physical location of a house within a municipality or the 
municipality itself within which the house is located.15 Under the 
second construction a police officer would be statutorily permitted to 
reside anywhere in a municipality whose border is within ten miles of 
the border of the city or town of employment even . though the em-
ployee's house might lie a greater distance from the city or town of 
employment. 
The Court believed that an attack based upon the constitutional 
ground of vagueness was an inappropriate challenge to the statute 
because it is not criminal in nature and does not burden fundamental 
rights.16 Nevertheless, the Court recognized its responsibility to correct 
any ambiguity or vagueness which might exist in the wording of the 
statute.17 Relying on both the language and the legislative purpose of 
the statute,18 the Court concluded that the statutory terms "reside" and 
"residence" are to be construed in such a way that the physical loca-
tion of the employee's dwelling place will be designated as the relevant 
measuring terminus.19 The Court then went on to hold that the officer's 
dwelling place itself must be within ten miles of the nearest border of 
the city or town of employment.20 
The Court rejected the ex post facto challenge. Like the vagueness 
doctrine, the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions 
apply only to criminal statutes.21 Though the statute might be harsh 
12 Id. at 420, 373 N.E.2d at 947, quoting Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 
144 n.4, 293 N.E.2d 268, 273 n.4 ( 1973 ), wherein the Court stated that the 
legislature "may restrict local legislative action or deny municipalities power to act 
at all." 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 420, 373 N.E.2d at 947. 
14 Id. at 421, 373 N.E.2d at 948. 
15 Id. 
16 Id., citing Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 
U. PA. L. REV. 67 ( 1960). 
17 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 421, 373 N.E.2d at 948. 
18 Id. In the Court's view the "clear objective" of the statutory residency require-
ment is to ensure the rapid mobilization of police officers in times of emergency. Id. 
19 Id. 
2o Id. at 422, 373 N.E.2d at 948. 
21 Id. at 424, 373 N.E.2d at 949. This is obvious even under a cursory reading 
of the Massachusetts constitutional provision, also set out supra note 9. The federal 
16
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in reqmrmg some police officers to move their residences in order to 
keep their employment, as a civil statute "such hardship does not render 
a statute invalid as an ex post facto law." 22 
The second case raising a challenge to section 99A was Burke v. Chief 
of Police of Newton.23 Burke had all the issues of Doris, plus the con-
structional issue of how to measure the ten mile requirement. The 
Newton police chief had informed the members of the department that 
their homes would have to be within ten road miles of Newton's citv 
limits.24 Burke's contention was that residence within a town that lay 
within ten miles of Newton's city limits sufficed, thus bringing him in 
compliance with section 99A. 25 Having already ruled in Doris that the 
statutory distance will be measured from the officer's home to the city 
limits of the municipality where he worked,26 the Court in Burke only 
considered how the term "miles" was to be construed. 
The Court determined that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "ten 
miles" is "miles as may be computed by measuring the straight line 
distance between two points on a map."27 It rejected the police chief's 
"road miles" formulation, advanced by the plaintiff, for two reasons. 
First, the legislature simply used the term "miles." Had it intended that 
the measure would be by existing roads, the Court assumed it "would 
have used the term 'road miles.'" 28 Secondly, an "existing road miles" 
construction was seen as unreasonable by the Court because the fortuity 
of a road being closed, rerouted, or made one-way could cause an 
officer with a permissible residence to suddenly become in violation 
of the statute. Such a change would subject the officer to "unpredictable 
events over which he has no controF29 
For these reasons the Court held in Burke that the statutory ten miles 
is to be measured "as the crow flies," so to speak. While the spectre 
of a change in roads was probably not raised by the record, and thus 
provides a dubious, speculative ground for the Court's decision, the 
Court's simple construction is harmonious with the language of the 
statute. Whatever hardship it might work in borderline cases, this 
construction does have the virtue of easy application. 
provision, also set out supra at note 9, has also been interpreted to apply only to 
criminal statutes. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 662 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 424, 373 N.E.2d at 949. 
23 Id. at 425, 373 N.E.2d at 949. 
24 Id. at 426, 373 N.E.2d at 950. 
25 Id. 
26 See text at notes 19 and 20 supra. 
27 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 428, 373 N.E.2d at 951. 
28 Id. at 427, 373 N.E.2d at 951. 
29 Id. 
17
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§12.4. Higher Protection under Massachusetls Constitution for Free-
dom of Speech than under Federal Constitution. Since the appointment 
of Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice, the United States Supreme Court 
has substantially curtailed the ability of individuals to vindicate funda-
mental rights in the federal courts. This has been accomplished both 
by the Court's purposeful contraction of the substantive content of fed-
eral constitutional rights 1 and by the increased number of procedural 
impediments utilized by the Court to prevent a litigant from gaining 
access to the federal court system." 2 The attitude displayed by the Bur-
ger Court has rekindled the dying ember of the philosophical concept 
of "states' rights." 3 
By applying their own substantive law, the states can give a more 
expansive reading to those rights which have been restricted by the 
Supreme Court. It would appear that as long as the basis for a state 
court decision is adequate and independent from any federal ground, 
it will not be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court.4 
§12.4. 1 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 ( 1975) (police need not halt 
questioning of a suspect after a request for an attorney and statements obtained are 
admissible to impeach defendant); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) 
(grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on grounds that the 
questions are based on evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment). 
2 In addition to affording a greater weight to considerations of comity and 
federalism, the Court has tightened the requirements of standing and justiciability 
and has substantially narrowed the situations where federal habeas corpus relief is 
available. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 ( 1976) (where state has provided 
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim, the Constitu-
tion does not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief 
on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was 
introduced at his trial); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 ( 1975) (imposing a strict 
requirement of direct causal relationship between the conduct complained of by the 
plaintiff and the injury alleged); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (when state 
has begun prosecution, notions of comity and federalism demand that federal courts 
not interfere except where there is a great and immediate danger of irreparable 
loss, or where proscution is in bad faith). 
3 Indeed one of the Court's most ardent activists during the Warren years, the 
period when the states lost considerable autonomy to the activist Court, ironically 
has been encouraging development along these lines. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96 ( 1975 ), Justice Brennan opined in dissent: 
In light of today' s erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of federal 
constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe that no state is precluded by the 
decision from adhering to higher standards under state law. Each State has 
power to impose higher standards police practices under state law than is re-
quired by the Federal Constitution. 
Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has renewed his appeal to the 
state courts on numerous occasions since then. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 454 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 
338-39 and n.10 ( 1976)' (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 
735 and n.18 (1976) (Brennan, J ., dissenting). 
4 Herb v. Pitcain, 324 U.S. 117 ( 1945). Recently, in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 
714 (1975), the Supreme Court acknowledged that "a State is free as a matter of its 
own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those the Court holds 
to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards. Id. at 719. 
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At least one state has displayed a willingness to take Justice Brennan's 
cue in this regard 5 and indications are that others will follow. 6 During 
the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court set Massachusetts on this 
course, thus indicating a willingness to take the initiative in this regard. 
In Commonwealth v. Sees,1 the defendant was the manager of an 
establishment in Revere which held an entertainment and all alcoholic 
beverage license. On an evening in July, 1974, a female dancer per-
formed for one or two minutes on the dance floor in the establishment, 
wearing only a "G-string." 8 The defendant, who was present when the 
dance occurred, was subsequently charged with the violation of a 
Revere city ordinance.9 After conviction in both the district court and 
the superior court, the defendant was granted direct appellate review 
by the Supreme Judicial Court.10 
Having decided in a previous case that the ordinance in question was 
not on its face inconsistent with either the United States or Massachu-
setts Constitutions, 11 the Court addressed itself to the validity of the 
ordinance as applied to the facts of this case. The defendant's conten-
tion before the Supreme Judicial Court was that the conduct underlying 
the charge-dancing-was a form of expression, that the governmental 
interest in its regulation (the Revere ordinance) suppresses free ex-
pression, and that "the incidental restriction of first amendment freedoms 
involved in this case is greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
5 See State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. 25, 247 N.W.2d 673 (1976). 
6 Justice Stanley Mask of the Supreme Court of California has stated that there 
is "not the slightest impropriety when the highest court of a state invalidates state 
legislation, state administrative action, or the conviction of a defendant il} a state 
prosecution as being violative of the state constitution." Mask, The New States' 
Rights, 10 CALIF. L. ENFORCEMENT 81, 82 ( 1976). 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 536, 373 N.E.2d 1151. 
s Id. at 537-38, 373 N.E.2d at 1153. 
9 Id. at 538, 373 N.E.2d at 1154. REVERE, MASS. REv. ORDs. c. 13, art. 3, §§ 
13-26 (1972) provided in part: 
The following acts or conduct in or on premises licensed in accordance with 
Chapter 140, Sec. 181, or Sec. 183A are deemed contrary to the public need 
and to the common good and therefore no license shall be held for the sale 
of alcoholic beverages to be served and drunk on the licensed premises where 
such acts or conduct are permitted. 
(a) It is forbidden to employ or permit any person in or on the licensed 
premises while such person is unclothed or in such attire as to expose to view 
any portion of the areola of the female breast or any portion of the pubic hair, 
cleft of the buttocks, or genitals. 
ro 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 538, 373 N.E.2d at 1153. 
11 Revere v. Aucella, 369 Mass. 138, 338 N .E.2d 816 ( 1975), appeal dUimUised sub 
nom. Charger Invs. Inc. v. Corbett, 429 U.S. 877 ( 1976). In Aucella the Court 
preserved the ordinance's constitutionality against an overbreadth callenge by inter-
preting it to apply only to "licensed, premises" subject both to a license for the sale 
of alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the premises and to an entertainment license. 
Id. at 146, 338 N.E.2d at 821. 
19
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governmental interest." 12 The Court agreed with the defendant's con-
tention, holding "that the application of the ordinance to the circum-
stances of this case abridges the right of free speech, contrary to art. 16 
of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution."13 It 
was the Court's opinion that this holding, while required by the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, was not necessary under an application of the 
United States Constitution.14 Recognizing that the • United States Su-
preme Court has included conduct such as "dancing" within the protec-
tions afforded by the first amendment, the Court cited two recent 
decisions which have declared that "[a]s a matter of Federal law 'the 
broad powers of the States to regulate the sale of liquor, conferred by 
the Twenty-first Amendment' outweigh 'any First Amendment interest 
in nude dancing.' " 15 Therefore, the Court concluded, a state may ban 
"nude dancing," if it so desires, as part of its liquor program and not be 
in contravention of the United States Constitution.16 
Focusing, therefore, on the free speech provision of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the Court noted that the provision makes no distinction 
between free speech in a bar and free speech on a stage. Thus, the Court 
concluded that the exercise is· protected regardless of where it occurs.17 
Even though the ordinance in question is limited to places dispensing 
alcoholic beverages, the Massachusetts Constitution, unlike the federal 
constitution, gives no preferred position to the regulation of alcoholic 
beverages.18 The Court therefore concluded that the ordinance was 
invalid as applied to the dancing that had occurred in the instant case.19 
The Court made it clear in its opinion, however, that there may be 
instances where the ordinance in question would be considered a valid 
regulation of speech otherwise protected by the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights.2o 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 540, 373 N.E.2d at 1154. 
13 Id. at 536-37, 373 N.E.2d at 1153. Mass. Const. pt. I, art. XVI provides: 
"The Liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought 
not, therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth. The right of free speech 
shall not be abridged." 
14 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 541, 373 N.E.2d at 1155. 
15 Id., citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975). 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 541, 373 N.E.2d at 1155. 
17 Id. at 542, 373 N.E.2d at 1155. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 The Court observed: 
We are somewhat troubled by the thought that some such performances may 
b~ demeaning to the employees who perform and to others like them. But no 
argument on these lines seems to have entered into the pro'tess 'of enactment of 
the ordinance, and no such argument is presented to us. We leave the point to 
another day. 
Id. at 543, 373 N.E.2d at 1156, 
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The significance of the course the Court has set out on-affording 
greater individual freedom through the Massachusetts Constitution-is 
underscored by the two dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Hennessey 
wrote: "I do not believe that we should apply the First P.'llendment 
more broadly [to the area of alcoholic beverage control] than the 
Supreme Court chose to do; nor should we apply provisions of our 
State Constitution similarly to limit state control." 21 Justice Quirico 
wrote: "I would not interpret or apply art. 16 as affording Cindy Mar-
tini [the dancer] or the defendant any greater right, or as affording the 
citizens of Revere any lesser right, than they would have under the 
First Amendment as construed by the United States Supreme Court 
in United States v. O'Brien." 22 
§12.5. Vagueness: General Laws Chapter 272, Section 35: "Unna-
tural and Lascivious Act." One of the basic principles of our system is 
that a person may do, with impunity, whatever is not forbidden by law. 
A corollary to this principle is the principle of legality: no person may 
be punished for conduct unless the law has, with a reasonable degree 
of certainty, already defined it as criminal.1 These concepts translate 
into what has become known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a 
doctrine embodied in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution.2 
The vagueness doctrine is not applied in a literal fashion, since legis-
lation is by no means an exact science. and the law is necessarily full 
of fairly vague statements.3 When confronted with a statutory challenge 
21 Id. at 545, 373 N.E.2d at 1156 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting). 
22 Id. at 557, 373 N.E.2d at 1160-61 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
§12.5. 1 In Commonwealth v. Sloane, 321 Mass. 713, 75 N.E.2d 517 ( 1947), the 
Supreme Judicial Court remarked: 
A statute creating a crime must be sufficiently definite in specifying the conduct 
that is commended or inhibited so that a man of ordinary intelligence may be 
able to ascertain whether any act or omission of his, as the case may be, will come 
within the sweep of the statute. It must fix with a reasonable degree of definite-
ness what it requires or prohibits. It should furnish a definite standard as a 
guide to determine what it denounces and condemns. . . . One ought not to 
be compelled to speculate at his peril as to whether a statute permits or pro-
hibits any action which he proposes to take. 
Id. at 715, 75 N.E.2d at 519. 
2 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). Cf. Note, The Void-for-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). An additional, 
and no less important, reason why vague statutes are proscribed by the due process 
clause is that they encourage arbitrary law enforcement. Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 ( 1972). 
3 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 ( 1952). In this case, 
Justice Clark stated the approach of the Court as follows: 
[F]ew words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes 
must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the 
practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit 
the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, 
21
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the Court will characteristically engage in a process of balancing com-
peting interests. On the one hand, the individual has a right to know 
in advance where he stands, so that he may understand just what con-
duct is forbidden. On the other hand, written language is at best a 
deficient medium for expressing ideas, and legislatures should not be 
held to impossible standards of specificity. 
Vagueness has become a routine, although generally unsuccessful, 
challenge to criminal statutes.4 Courts are inclined to defer to legislative 
wisdom in this procedural due process area, as they are so inclined in 
the area of substantive due process. In order to uphold statutes attacked 
on vagueness grounds, the courts traditionally have relied on the com-
mon usage of the statutory language, previous judicial explanations of 
the statute's meaning, and previous applications of the statute to the 
same or similar conduct.5 Under the first approach, the court determines 
that the language chosen by the legislature is not vague. Under the 
second and third approaches the court may concede that the language 
of the statute is impermissibly vague, but the defect is cured by prior 
judicial constructions that gives the statute meaning.6 
Statutes regulating sexual conduct often foster vagueness challenges 
because the legislatures are too embarrassed to spell out what is being 
proscribed. Moreover, given our rapidly changing sexual mores, con-
duct once considered "unnatural" by most of society ceases to be so 
regarded by many members of society. Prior to and during the Survey 
year, just such a statute was under attack in one case that wended its 
way through the Supreme Judicial Court/ a federal district court,8 and 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.9 
In 1973, Richard Balthazar was tried and convicted in the Superior 
Court for Norfolk County for the crime of committing an "unnatural 
no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair 
to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed 
conduct shall take the risk that he may cross . the line. 
I d. at 340. 
4 But a vagueness challenge was recently mounted against a civil statute in Doris 
v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 416, 373 N.E.2d 944. The 
Court rebuffed the challenge in part because the vagueness doctrine is not applied 
to civil statutes. See § 12.3 supra. 
5 Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 ( 1975). In Rose the Court rejected a vagueness 
challenge to a Tennessee statute proscribing "crimes against nature" as applied to 
cunnilingus. The Court did so relying on prior Tennessee precedents and the 
recognized common law meaning of the term "crimes against nature." The Court 
stated th~t "anyone who cared to do so could certainly determiqe what particular 
acts have been considered crimes against nature . . . ." Id. at 50. 
6 See Rose, note 5 supra. 
7 Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298,318 N.E.2d 478 ( 1974). 
8 Balthazar v. Superior Court, 428 F. Supp. 424 (D. Mass. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 
698 (1st Cir. 1978). 
9 Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978). 
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and lascivious act with another person," in contravention of General 
Laws chapter 272, section 35.10 At Balthazar's trial, the victim of the 
alleged crime testified that she mistakenly entered a car being driven 
by the defendant and was prevented from leaving it at knifepoint. 11 
Balthazar then drove her to a secluded area and ordered her to take 
off her blouse and pants. He then ordered her to comll).it an act of 
fellatio on him and "to put . . . [her] tongue on his backside."12 She 
complied. Subsequently, the defendant drove her to Boston and let her 
go. Later, the defendant was apprehended at a time and place where 
the victim said she had agreed to meet him. Balthazar did not testify 
at the trial and there were no other witnesses to the alleged crime.13 
He was acquited on an assault charge tried with the unnatural act 
charge.14 
Balthazar appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, alleging inter alia, that chapter 272, section 35, was uncon-
stitutionally vague.15 The Supreme Judicial Court, relying on a previous 
decision which had upheld the constitutionality of the statute, affirmed 
the trial court's decision.16 The Court recognized that the language of 
the statute, standing alone, did present some problems. However, the 
judicial construction afforded the statute in ]acquith v. Commonwealth 17 
was enough in the Court's opinion to render the statute sufficiently 
precise to pass muster under the due process clause.18 
10 G.L. c. 272, § 35 provides: "Whoever commits any unnatural and lascivious act 
with another person shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor 
more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment in the state prison for not more 
than five xears or in jail or the house of correction for not more than two and one 
half years. ' 
11 Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. at 299, 318 N.E.2d at 479. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 299-300, 318 N.E.2d at 479. 
15 Id. at 300, 318 N.E.2d at 480. Balthazar first made a motion in superior court 
to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of vagueness. The superior court denied 
the motion, suggesting that such an argument was more appropriately addressed to 
the Appeals Court or the Supreme Judicial Court. 428 F. Supp. at 431. 
16 366 Mass. at 304, 318 N.E.2d at 482. 
17 331 Mass. 439, 120 N.E.2d 189 (1954). The ]acquith Court defined the 
words "unatural and lascivious" in the following way: 
They signify irregular indulgence in sexual behavior, illicit sexual relations and 
infamous conduct, which is lustful, obscene, and in deviation of accepted customs 
and manners [citations ommited] .... It is enough to say that it generally has 
been held that the common sense of the community, as well as the sense of 
decency, propriety, and morality which all respectable persons usually entertain, 
is sufficient to apply the statute to a situation and determine what particular 
kind of conduct offends. 
Id. at 442-43, 120 N.E.2d at 192. 
18 366 Mass. at 300-01, 318 N.E.2d at 480. The Court significantly narrowed 
the reach of section 35, however, by holding that it does not apply to private con-
sensual adult sexual oonduct. Id. at 302, 318 N.E.2d at 481. 
23
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Balthazar, after being denied a rehearing by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.19 
The court directed Balthazar to seek a new trial in superior court in 
order to exhaust his state court remedies.20 When this was done, and 
proved of no avail, he renewed his petition in the federal court.21 The 
court, in 1977, held that Balthazar had met the requirements of the 
exhaustion of remedies doctrine, and proceeded to decide the vagueness 
claim.22 
The district court framed the issue as "whether the language of § 35 
or the state court constructions of it, indicate that it applies to fellatio 
or oral-anal contact." 23 The court then stated that it would determine 
the vagueness of section 35 as of two dates, the time of the petitioner's 
arrest and conviction (July, 1972 to June, 1973) 24 and the present time.25 
The Commonwealth argued that the statute was sufficiently narrowed 
in scope by the 1954 decision of ]acquith v. Commonwealth,26 thus pro-
viding fair warning sufficient to meet the due process mandate.27 The 
court disagreed, holding that ]acquith did not define the phrase "un-
natural and lascivious acts" with sufficient specificity.28 Indeed, the court 
pointed out that ]acquith, by referring to dictionary meanings, actually 
defined another statute, chapter 272, section 34.29 It concluded that 
]acquith "seems to compound rather than resolve the ambiguity." 30 The 
court thus held: 
19 Balthazar v. Superior Court, 428 F. Supp. 424, 426 (D. Mass. 1977). The 
writ was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ( 1970). 
20 428 F. Supp. at 429. The requirement of exhaustion of state court remedies 
is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ( 1976). 
21 428 F. Supp. at 429. 
22 Id. at 427, 429. 
23 Id. at 432. 
24 Id. The court's reference to construing the vagueness of section 35 as of the 
time of Balthazar's conviction does not seem correct. A person cannot be given fair 
warning to enable him to conform his conduct to the law's requirements if the fair 
warning comes only as he is tried and convicted. The only relevant measuring 
period is the time that the conduct took place. In fact, the court only looked to this 
point, noting that Commonwealth v. Deschamps, 1 Mass. App. 1, 294 N.E.2d 426 
( 1972) applied § 35 to fellatio; but was decided after Balthazar's arrest. 428 
F. Supp. at 433 n.10. Since Deschamps was decided in December 1972, several 
months before Balthazar's conviction in June 1973, the court seems to have implicitly 
disregarded Deschamps as relevant to the issue of fair warning to the petitioner. 
25 428 F. Supp. at 432. 
26 See note 17 supra. 
27 428 F. Supp. at 431. 
28 I d. at 433. 
29 Id. G.L. c. 272, § 34 provides: "Whoever commits the abominable and detest-
able crime against nature, either with mankind or with a beast, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years." 
30 428 F. Supp. at 433. A major infirmity of the ]acquith formulation to the 
district court was its direction to define the proscribed conduct by community sensi-
24
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The Massachusetts cases prior to July 1972, the date of petitioner's 
conduct, did not perform that remedial function. They did not 
serve to provide "fair warning." On the contrary, those cases are 
distinguished by their delicate and ambiguous discussions of the 
conduct involved in § 35 cases. No reported case in the Common-
wealth had expressly applied the "unnatural and lascivious" act 
prohibition to fellatio or oral-anal contact.31 
While holding that section 35 was unconstitutionally vague at· the 
time of Balthazar's conduct, the court held that section 35 was no longer 
vague, due to subsequent Massachusetts decisions. These decisions were 
Commonwealth v. Deschamps, 32 holding that fellatio constitutes an 
unnatural act, Commonwealth v. LaBella,33 holding that .cunnilingus 
constitutes an unnatural act, and petitioner's own appeal to the Supreme 
Judicial Comt, which held that section 35 does not apply to such con-
duct where it takes place in private between consenting adults.34 The 
court concluded that "[t]he clear impact of these decisions was to put 
the public on notice that § 35 forbids specific types of non-consensual 
sexual conduct . . . ." 35 
The Commonwealth appealed the district comt's decision, and in 
April 1978 in Balthazar v. Superior Court,36 the First Circuit affirmed 
the district court as to the unconstitutional vagueness of the statute as 
applied to Balthazar's conduct.37 Essentially, the circuit court in its 
opinion adopted the same reasoning and rationale as the district court. 
Most significantly, the court of appeals, like the district court, held that 
while section 35 at the time of Balthazar's conduct had no well-defined 
and generally accepted meaning, the subsequent decisions of the Mas-
sachusetts courts narrowing the definition of conduct proscribed by 
section 35 had rendered it sufficiently precise to survive any further 
attacks for unconstitutional vagueness.38 
The Balthazar cases provide an excellent study of the vagueness doc-
trine in operation, in an area where statutes tend to be vague. They 
demonstrate good and bad instances of the curative process of judicial 
bilities, which are subject to subtle shifting. The court stated: "[T]he public 
should not be required at its peril to anticipate a judicial pronouncement that public 
standards of morality have changed. It is the function of the legislature, not the 
judiciary, to establish what conduct is to be proscribed." Id. 
31 I d. at 433-34. 
32 1 Mass. App. 1, 294 N.E.2d 426 ( 1972). 
33 364 Mass. 550,306 N.E.2d 813 ( 1974). 
34 Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E.2d 478 ( 1974). 
35 428 F. Supp. at 434. 
36 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978). 
37 Id. at 699. 
as Id. at 702. 
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definition. The process has been enhanced by the readily apparent 
degree of forthrightness the courts now use in defining the statute, 
which stands in marked contrast to the unsatisfactory definition by 
innuendo provided by the Supreme Judicial Court two decades ago 
in ]acquith. Though some readers of the reports may flnd such explicit-
ness somewhat offensive, it does not compare to the offensiveness caused 
by a vague or vaguely defined sexual statute in an era of rapidly 
changing sexual mores where one man's passion is another man's moral 
poison. 
§12.6. Scope of Exclusionary Rule in Noncriminal Cases in which 
Government Is a Party. In Board of Selectmen of Framingham v. Mu-
nicipal Court of the City of Boston,1 decided during the Survey year, 
the Supreme Judicial Comt had the opportunity to address the scope 
of the rule excluding evidence obtained in an illegal search. Before 
discussing the case, however, a brief history of the rule will be set 
forth. 
In 1914 the United States Supreme Court first recognized that, in 
criminal cases, the sanction of exclusion is absolutely necessary in order 
to give force and effect to the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution.2 Prior to this time, the common law rule had been that 
otherwise competent evidence was admissible even though it was secured 
by means of an illegal search and seizure.3 The states, however, were 
free to reject the Weeks rule until the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio,4 
decided in 1961. In Mapp, Justice Clark, in an exhaustive opinion, 
wrote that twenty-three states had voluntarily chosen to follow the 
exclusionary rule without federal compulsion.5 He also maintained that 
other possible remedies for unlawful searches and seizures, such as · 
criminal prosecutions and suits for damages, had proved both "worth-
less and futile." 6 The conclusion of the Court in Mapp was that the 
exclusionary rule is an essential part of the right of privacy, and no 
person can be convicted by unconstitutional evidence, whether in a 
state or federal court. 7 The purpose and underlying rationale of the 
§12.6. 1 373 Mass. 783, 369 N.E.2d 1145 (1977). 
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ( 1914). Weeks involved a pretr,ial 
motion for the return of papers that were seized unlawfully. A federal trial court 
denied the motion and a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that such denial was 
prejudicial error. Justice Day, speaking for the Court, stated that if the documents 
in question could be held and used in evidence in a criminal trial, then the protection 
of the fourth amendment might just as well be stricken from the Constitution. Id. 
at 393. 
3 See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). 
4 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
5 Id. at 651. 
6 Id. at 652. 
7 Id. at 660. 
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rule, as articulated by one commentator, is "to deter unlawful or 
undesirable or unconstitutional police conduct, and . . . to insure some 
integrity in the judicial process by not having the judicial process sanc-
tion, approve, and be party to constitutional violations or undesirable 
or unlawful police· conduct in allowing evidence to be used notwith-
standing the manner in which it was seized." 8 
The Warren Court, which extended the exclusionary rule to the states, 
made clear that state searches and seizures were to be evaluated accord-
ing to federal standards as spelled out in the fourth amendment and 
the interpretive decisions of the Court.9 In addition, the Court ultimately 
ruled that the exclusionary rule is not limited to criminal prosecutions 
but applies to forfeiture proceedings as well, such proceedings being 
regarded as quasi-criminal in nature.10 
The retirement of Chief Justice Warren and subsequent appointment 
of Chief Justice Burger brought a stern and seasoned critic of the rule 
to the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice announced in an early dissent-
ing opinion that the exclusionary rule "is both conceptually sterile and 
practically ineffective," and altogether too inflexible, though he stated 
that he hesitated to abandon it until some "meaningful substitute" is 
developed.11 While not abandoning the rule completely, the Burger 
Court has clearly signalled that it will not be extended.12 Moreover, 
the Court has recently shifted away from a judicial integrity rationale 
for the rule, emphasizing instead the deterrence purpose. The Court 
stated in United States v. Janis 13 that "the 'prime purpose' of the rule, 
if not the sole one, is to deter future unlawful police misconduct." 14 
In Janis, evidence seized by state officers acting in good faith under 
an invalid search warrant was held admissible in a civil action for 
refund or collection of federal taxes.15 In allowing the evidence, the 
Court reasoned that "the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant 
evidence is highly attenuated when the 'punishment' imposed upon the 
8 Remarks of Mr. Donald E. Santarelli at a conference on the exclusionary rule 
before the 1972 Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Judicial Circuit, reproduced in 61 F.R.D. 259, 273 ( 1972). 
9 Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
10 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
11 Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 ( 1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
12 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra, the Court, by 
a 6-3 vote, decided that the exclusionary rule does not apply to testimony before grand 
juries. In the majority opinion, Justice Powell suggested that the prime purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is not to redress an injury to the privacy of the search victim, 
but rather, "to deter future unlawful police conduct." Id. at 347. 
13 428 u.s. 433 ( 1976). 
14 Id. at 446, quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. 
15 428 U.S. at 459-60. 
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offending criminal officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil 
suit by or against a different sovereign." 16 
In Board of Selectmen of Framingham, an off-duty Framingham police 
officer was' shot and wounded at his home,l7 He was found in front of 
the house next door and was taken by the police to a hospital.18 At 
4:30A.M. on that same day, the police, without a search warrant, gained 
access to the wounded officer's home and discovered a spent bullet 
casing and an automatic pistol which was concealed under clothing in 
a drawer in a bedroom on the second floor of the house.19 
Upon his recovery, the wounded officer was charged with insubordina-
tion at a hearing before the Framingham Board of Selectmen.20 At 
the hearing, substantial reliance was placed on the evidence obtained 
by the police in the warrantless search of the officer's home without 
his consent.21 The Board of Selectment of Framingham discharged 
the officer, which action was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission.22 
The decision of the Civil Service Commission was set aside by a judge 
of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston and in a certiorari action, 
the superior court affirmed the municipal court decision.23 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the 
lower court. 24 The Court held that the warrantless search of the wounded 
officer's home was illegal, that the evidence obtained as a result of 
the illegal search was thus inadmissible, and that the Civil Service 
Commission's ("the Commission") decision was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, once the illegally obtained evidence had been ex-
cluded.25 
In reaching its conclusion that the search had been illegal, the Court 
rejected the Commission's contention that the failure of the police to 
obtain a warrant was justified because of exigent circumstances.26 The 
Court observed that when searches are conducted without a warrant, 
the burden falls upon the government to show that the particular situa-
tion was within "a narrow class of exigent circumstances." 27 The Court 
16 Id. at 457-58. 
17 373 Mass. at 784, 369 N.E.2d at 1146. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 785, 369 N.E.2d at 1146. 
20 Id. at 784, 369 N.E.2d at 1146. The board charged that the officer had refused 
to state facts, of which he had knowledge, to investigating officers and had refused 
to cooperate in an official investigation at the direction of his superior. Id. 
21 Id. at 784-85, 369 N.E.2d at 1146. 




26 Id. at 785-86, 369 N.E.2d at 1146-47. 
27 Id. at 785, 369 N.E.2d at 1146-47, citing Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 
798, 800-01, 329 N.E.2d 717, 719 ( 1975). 28
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went on to note that the warrantless search of a dwelling place will 
be subject to particularly close judicial scrutiny.28 Subjecting the situa-
tion in question to this close scrutiny, the Court concluded that the 
facts fell far short of establishing the urgent need required to mitigate 
the lack of a search warrant. 29 
Having found the search itself illegal, the Court then proceeded to 
address the issue of the admissibility of its fruits in a situation in which 
the government opposes an individual in a non-criminal proceeding. 
The Court found ample precedent in other jurisdictions for use of the 
exclusionary rule in cases involving the discharge of a public employee.30 
The Court concluded that in the situation presented by Board of Select-
men of Framingham judicial integrity was at stake, in the sense that, 
as the Court saw it, "government is seeking to take advantage of its 
own lawbreaking to punish the victim of that illegality." 31 Thus, the 
Court found the evidence in question inadmissible. 
While the Court's decision in Board of Selectmen of Framingham is 
factually compatible with Janis, in that the searching officers there were 
found to have executed an invalid warrant in good faith, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has gone a step further than the United States Supreme 
Court. Janis stressed the deterrent role of the exclusionary rule, referring 
to judicial integrity as "a relevant, albeit subordinate, factor." 32 But 
the Supreme Judicial Court, after examining the Janis decision,33 has 
resurrected the preservation of judicial integrity as a primary purpose 
behind the rule. The Court's position, resting on state law, 34 is consistent 
with the view of Justice Brennan of the Supreme Court. Justice Bren-
. nan has asserted that the exclusionary rule was designed mainly to 
enable the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official law-
lessness and to assure the people that the government would not 
profit by its own lawless behavior.35 
§12.7. Constitutionality of Chapter 94C, Section 34. For the first 
time in almost a decade the Supreme Judicial Court was presented 
during the Survey year with a constitutional challenge to the legislative 
prohibitions on the use and possession of marijuana. In Marcoux v. 
28 373 Mass. at 785, 369 N.E.2d at 1147. 
29 Id. at 785-86, 369 N.E.2d at 1147: 
30 Id. at 787, 369 N.E.2d at 1148, citing Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966); Saylor v. United States, 374 F.2d 894, 989-901 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Rinder-
knecht v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System, 21 Ariz. App. 419, 520 P.2d 
332, vacated due to settlement, 111 Ariz. 174,526 P.2d 713 (1974). 
31 373 Mass. at 787, 369 N.E.2d at 1147. 
32 428 U.S. at 458 n.35. 
33 373 Mass. at 786, 369 N.E.2d at 1147. 
34 See Mass. Canst. pt. I, art. XIV. 
35 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 ( 1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Attorney General, 1 the constitutionality of General Laws chapter 94C, 
section 34,2 was considered by the Court. Plaintiff Marcoux and others 
requested a declaratory judgment on the application of section 34 to 
the possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use.3 The 
Attorney General responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss.4 
While recognizing the existence of a controversy suitable for a declara-
tion, a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless upheld 
the statute's constitutionality," relying essentially on the 1969 decision 
of Commonwealth v. Leis.6 The Supreme Judicial Court, refusing to 
overrule Leis, affirmed the judgment of the single justice.7 
At the outset of its opinion in Marcoux, the Court stated that the 
use of marijuana does not involve a liberty of high constitutional rank 
such that governmental infringement would demand extremely close 
scrutiny by the Court. 8 Reviewing its analysis in Leis, the Court noted 
that in applying a rational relation test in that case, it had drawn the 
conclusion that "the Legislature could believe with reason that use 
§12.7. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1011, 375 N.E.2d 688. The action was a class 
action brought by thirty-seven individuals. 
2 G.L. c. 94C, § 34, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 369, provides in part: 
No person knowingly or intentionally shall possess a controlled substance 
unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription 
or order, from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or except as otherwise authorized by the provisions of this chapter. . . . [A]ny 
person who violates this section by possession of marihuana or a controlled 
substance in Class E of section thirty-one shall be punished by imprisonment in a 
house of correction for not more than six months or a fine of five hundred dollars 
or both .... 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1011, 375 N.E.2d at 688. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1011-12, 375 N.E.2d at 688. 
6 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d at 898 (1969). 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1012, 375 N.E.2d at 689. 
8 Id. The Court indicated that it had tested the validity of the legislation in 
question in the Leis case by inquiring whether the complete prohibition of the use 
of marijuana bore a reasonable relation to any permissible legislative objective, such 
as protection of public health or safety. 
This standard is typical of the type of analysis utilized by the United States Supreme 
Court in situations where the Court believes that governmental action interferes with 
an individual's freedom in an area which has not been characterized as fundamental. 
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 ( 1923). Contrast this standard with one 
the Supreme Court often utilizes when governmenal action infringes upon what the 
Court characterizes as a fundamental right of an individual. "Where there is a 
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon 
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
155(1973). 
The Supreme Judicial Court made it clear that merely because it was using a 
rational relation standard of review did not indicate thl),t it had reached a preordained 
conclusion favorable to the legislation. Interestingly, the Court went on the imply 
that it would utilize a standard of inquiry which closely approximates that suggested 
by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in San Antonia Ind. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1978 [1978], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1978/iss1/15
§12.7 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295 
of marijuana created dangers both to users and to others justifying 
public control." 9 The Marcoux Court went on to state that if the 
plaintiffs could establish that "doubts about ... [marijuana] had been 
resolved in its favor beyond reasonable scientific dispute," 10 a different 
result might be reached using the same standard used in the Leis case.U 
As the Court noted, however, the plaintiffs had conceded that the con-
tinuing medical and social debate as to the dangers of marijuana use 
had not eliminated the apprehension of dangers to health and safety 
that were present when the Leis case was decided.12 The thrust of 
the plaintiffs argument in Marcoux was that notwithstanding these 
concessions the legislation in question was constitutionally infirm because 
it invaded a "zone of privacy" and thus was required to be justified by 
a substantial governmental interest.13 
While admitting that judicial protection of privacy has grown in 
recent years, the Marcoux Court was careful to note that this expansion 
has been directly related to "individual choice as to procreation and 
other core concerns of human existence." 14 Further, the Court accen-
tuated its own perspective on the growth of a "zone of privacy" by citing 
its recent decision in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 15 in which the Court recognized, as part of a protected zone 
of privacy, the right of an individual to choose whether to accept or 
decline medical treatment without governmental interference.16 The 
Marcoux Court stated: "[T]he right to possess or use marijuana cannot 
be readily assimilated in character or importance to the kinds of rights 
just mentioned." 17 
The Court then turned its attention to the plaintiffs' argument that 
Stanley v. Georgia, decided after Leis, supported a right to privacy 
protecting personal consumption of marijuana.18 The plaintiffs likened 
the possession and use of marijuana in the home to the possession of 
obscene material in the home, which the Supreme Court held to be 
beyond the pale of the Georgia obscenity statute.19 The Stanley Court 




13 Id. at 1014, 375 N.E.2d at 690. The plaintiffs were attempting to bring the 
use of marijuana into the fold of an expanding concept of personal autonomy as a 
fundamental right. Thus their argument was that there is a constitutionally recognized 
"zone of privacy" in one's home for which legislation attempting to regulate in this 
area, must be supported by a compelling governmental interest. 
14 Id. at 1015, 375 N.E.2d at 690. 
15 373 Mass. 728, 370 N .E.2d 417 ( 1977). 
16 I d. at 739-40, 370 N.E.2d at 424. 
17 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1015, 375 N.E.2d at 690. 
18 394 u.s. 557 ( 1969). 
19 See id. at 565. 
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reasoned that: "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that 
a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what 
books he may read or what films he may watch." 20 Later Supreme 
Court opinions seemed to suggest, in dicta, that the Stanley case was 
decided "on the narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home,' which was 
hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle."' 21 
The Supreme Judicial Court minimized the impact of the Stanley 
rationale as developed by its progeny by suggesting that the first amend-
ment protection afforded in those cases was based on the completely 
private nature of the activities sought to be forbidden.22 The use of 
marijuana presented an entirely different situation in the Court's view. 
[W]e are bound to assume for constitutional purposes that the 
private use [of marijuana] does have public results, does spill over 
into the public domain and touch matters of legitimate State in-
terest, while the freedom impaired by the penal· statute, taken at 
its highest evaluation, does not reach the level of that freedom 
conceived by the [Supreme] Court to be implicated in Stanley.23 
The Court then cited a number of post-Stanley decisions from other 
jurisdictions which, with one exception, rejected a privacy protection 
for marijuana use.24 It then reaffirmed the legislature's broad power to 
act where it supposes marijuana use is harmful to its users. The Court 
identified the individual interest in using marijuana free from the reach 
of the police power as "in essence merely recreational." 25 This interest 
was then placed "on the continuum of constitutional vulnerability . . . 
where judicial nullification of the proscriptive legislation appears un-
\ warranted." 26 Finally the Court, referring to the vigor of the debate 
on the subject and recent activity by the General Court that lessened 
penalties,27 concluded that it is for the legislature "to decide, perhaps at 
the plaintiffs' urging, whether the present statute attains to the best solu-
tion." 28 
20 Id. 
21 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 ( 1973). Cf. United States 
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973), where the Court stated that the "Constitution 
extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other special 
privac~ ri9}1ts such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, childrearing, and 
education. 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1016-17, 375 N.E.2d at 691. 
23 Id. at 1017, 375 N.E.2d at 691. 
24 See id. at 1018, 375 N.E.-2d at 691 for cases cited. 
25 Id. at 1020, 375 N.E.2d at 692. 
26 I d. at 1018, 375 N.E.2d at 693. 
27 I d. at 1021, 375 N.E.2d at 693. 
28 Id. at 1021-22, 375 N.E.2d at 693. 
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